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Abstract
We apply a structural model to estimate firm-level default risk in China and investigate the 
stock return predictability of default risk and the moderating effects of state ownership for 
the sample period from 2003 to 2015. We show unique evidence that in China, default risk 
is positively associated with expected stock returns and state ownership matters consider-
ably to the return predictability of default risk. We find investors of state-owned enterprises 
are not compensated appropriately in China despite of their higher default risk exposure. 
Our empirical evidence supports the conjecture on shareholder advantages and suggests 
that a strong bargaining power of equity holders would have a negative impact on stock 
returns.
Keywords Chinese stock market · Default risk · Return predictability · State ownership
JEL Classification G14 · G15 · C14
Defaults in China’s local public bond market are a relatively new phenomenon, 
and have picked up pace since the government allowed the first one in 2014. 
There were a record 29 defaults on publicly issued notes in 2016, and there have 
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been 13 this year [2017], according to data compiled by Bloomberg. (May 25 
2017, Bloomberg)
1 Introduction
Recent corporate defaults of Chinese companies have drawn extensive media coverage and 
become ‘a cautionary tale for investors’.1 However, there has been little empirical investi-
gation on the relationship between corporate default risks and expected stock returns in a 
Chinese setting. At the moment, most of the existing empirical studies have attempted to 
employ various measures of default risk and to examine the ‘risk–return’ relationship in 
developed markets, such as U.S. (e.g. Dichev 1998; Chava and Purnanandam 2010), Aus-
tralia (e.g. Gharghori et al. 2009), and U.K. (e.g. Chen and Hill 2013). This paper, instead, 
aims to investigate the moderating effects of state-ownership on the ‘default risk–stock 
return’ relationship in a Chinese setting. This is particularly important for three reasons. 
First, empirical evidence on such a relationship has been inconclusive. On one hand, 
default risk has been found to be systematic and firms with greater default risk tend to 
return investors higher ‘default risk premium’ (e.g. Vassalou and Xing 2004). On the other, 
there has been empirical evidence on the negative relationship between default risk and 
future stock returns (e.g. Campbell et al. 2008). Such a ‘distress puzzle’ might be resulted 
from some of the firm-specific characteristics, such as high leverage and low profitability 
(Filipe et al. 2016).
Second, although several studies have evaluated the predictability of Chinese stock 
returns, results on the relationship between firm characteristics and stock returns are not 
in line with findings in other stock markets. For instance, Chen et al. (2010) test 18 return 
predictors and find that only 4 are significantly correlated with Chinese stock returns. In 
particular, predicting stock returns for Chinese SOEs is not easy due to their financial opac-
ity and low informativeness of share prices (e.g. Lee and Wang 2017). Moreover, the rela-
tionship between corporate default risk and stock returns is rarely studied in the context of 
Chinese stock market. The evaluation of corporate default risk in China becomes particu-
larly important when interest rate deregulation has intensified competition and a deteriora-
tion of the economic environment has increased the volatility and imposed higher default 
risks on highly leveraged firms. As a result, investors may require higher returns for bear-
ing higher default risk. Nevertheless, the perceived riskiness of high default risk firms of 
Chinese SOEs may differ with respect to non-SOEs.
Third, the implications of state-ownership for equity valuation and required return of 
shareholders appear ambiguous. On one hand, because the controlling shareholder of SOEs 
is the government, managers of SOEs can be induced to pursue political objectives rather 
than maximize corporate profits, resulting in the expropriation of minority shareholders 
(e.g. Ben-Nasr et al. 2012; Lee and Wang 2017). One typical evidence of this would be the 
burst of Chinese SOEs’ capital investment in real estate rather than productivity-enhancing 
corporate assets following financial crisis in response to central government’s monetary 
stimulus, which leads to inefficient capital allocation (Deng et  al. 2014). Additionally, 
1 Wuyang Construction Group Co., for example, defaulted in August 2017 with a total of USD $209 mil-
lion (September 10, 2017, Bloomberg) and Moody’s downgraded the nation’s credit rating in May 2017 
(May 25, 2017, Bloomberg) due to the concerns with the rising corporate debt and default.
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Huang (2016) finds such ‘‘Tunneling’’ phenomenon is prevalent among Chinese SOEs 
companies through the issuance of loan guarantees issued by listed firms to their related-
parties (RPLG). On the other hand, state-ownership has been perceived as a favorable sig-
nal of firm valuation. Du et al. (2016) find state-ownership has a positive and significant 
impact on Chinese acquirers’ returns in cross-border mergers and acquisitions. Moreover, 
it is widely accepted that government serves as implicit and explicit guarantor on loans 
issued to SOEs (e.g. Faccio 2010; Song et al. 2011).
The benefits of government protection enjoyed by distressed SOEs may outweigh their 
costs of distress, reducing the required rates of return by investors. This is consistent with 
the ‘shareholder advantage’ mechanism proposed in Garlappi et al. (2008), where with a 
stronger bargaining power in debt renegotiation, shareholders of SOEs tend to have lower 
required risk premium for default risk exposure. In addition, research has found that con-
nections with the government can reduce firm’s exposure to systematic risk as well as 
cost of equity capital, especially in the event of financial distress (Boubakri et al. 2012). 
As a result, our key conjecture would be that state-ownership may affect the relationship 
between default risk and expected stock returns in China.
This paper aims to investigate the cross-sectional relation between default risk and stock 
returns by considering the unique features of Chinese stock markets, which is missing 
from existing literature. We commence our analysis by estimating the monthly default risk 
(default likelihood indicators, DLI) based on Merton’s (1974) structural model for 213,173 
firm-month observations between 2003 and 2015 and then examine the return predicta-
bility of default risk using portfolio sorts and cross-sectional regression approaches, with 
additional double sorting robustness tests. We document time and ownership variation of 
default risk and show that firms under Specially Treatment (ST)2 and state-owned enter-
prises (SOEs) have higher default risk than their counterparts. In the empirical examina-
tion on the ‘risk–return’ relationship, we show that stock returns are positively and mono-
tonically associated with default risk, with and without a CAPM framework to control for 
market risk. By double sorting on size and default risk (and state-ownership and default 
risk), we show consistent evidence that the positive ‘risk–return’ relationship exists among 
small and non-SOEs only. Such a finding is further supported by the results of Fama–Mac-
beth regressions where SOEs with higher default risk do not compensate investors with 
higher returns. In addition, our multivariate regression results show that firms which are 
smaller, less profitable, highly leveraged, having less growth opportunities, operating in 
real estate and industrial sector, and ST firms tend to expose to a greater default risk. Our 
empirical results suggest that the positive ‘default risk–return’ relationship does exist in 
Chinese stock markets but for small and non-SOEs only. The state-ownership mitigates 
such a relationship.
As far as we are aware, this is the first empirical study which comprehensively inves-
tigates the default risk exposure of companies publicly listed in China and its relation-
ship with stock returns. We show novel evidence on the role played by state-ownership in 
mitigating the risk–return relationship and our empirical findings provide important impli-
cations to policy makers, creditors (e.g. banks) and investors. First, the increasing bank 
2 Chinese listed firms that have reported two consecutive annual losses (or whose book value becomes neg-
ative) are required to file for Specially Treatment (ST) status. The stock will be delisted if the firm reported 
four consecutive annual losses. The ST staus can be classified as ST, or *ST, or PT, which represents differ-
ent levels of financial distress. ST stocks are under various trading and financial restrictions. For instance, 
the daily price fluctuation limit of such stocks is 5%.
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non-performing loans (NPL) have been identified as a major concern for Chinese commer-
cial banks and regulators should take more considerations on corporate default risks when 
controlling for banking sector risk exposure and to scrutinize corporate bond offering. Sec-
ond, our results suggest that Chinese investors require a lower rate of return for investing in 
SOEs with high default risk, implying their beliefs that SOEs’ debt burden is backed by an 
implicit government guarantee. This serves as a valuable basis for evaluating the moderat-
ing impact of institutional environment on asset prices.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the institutional 
background of Chinese stock markets. Section 3 discusses the empirical methods employed 
and variables used with a particular focus on the estimation of default risk exposure. Sec-
tion 4 reports the empirical findings and Sect. 5 offers additional robustness tests. Finally, 
Sect. 6 concludes the paper.
2  Institutional background of Chinese stock market 
and state‑ownership
Since the economic reform initiated in China in the late 1970s, financial institutions have 
been playing a critical role in financing businesses and supporting economic growth. As a 
milestone of the financial system reform, Shanghai Stock Exchange (SSE) and Shenzhen 
Stock Exchange (SZSE) were established in the early 1990s to facilitate the corporate own-
ership reform of SOEs and to improve the allocational efficiency of the Chinese financial 
markets. However, various restrictions imposed on stock issuing and trading, such as the A 
and B-share split, have led to market segmentation and high trading volatility (Groenewold 
et al. 2003). Meanwhile, the Special Treatment (ST) policy was initiated in 1998 to detect 
financially distressed firms and serves as an early warning signal to market participants. A 
ST firm will be either recovered via the removal of its special treatment or delisted in terms 
of its further performance.
SOEs have been playing an important role in the economic growth in China, such as 
being the key instruments in implementing government strategic plans. Therefore, with the 
development over nearly three decades, the stock markets in China are still characterized 
by a dominance of state-ownership and before ‘Split Share Structure Reform’ in 2005, for 
example, nearly two thirds of non-tradable shares in China were state-owned (Yang et al. 
2015).3 Meanwhile, the practice of soft lending is common in China where large state-
owned banks (SOBs) are required to provide consistent support to financially constrained 
SOEs, leading to increasing inefficiency in credit allocation (Cull and Xu 2003, 2005). 
Hence, SOEs in China have superior access to financial markets compared with private 
firms on one hand, and they usually have lower operating efficiencies and are less profit-
able on the other (Fan et al. 2013).
The ‘Split Share Structure Reform’ was implemented in 2005 to improve the operating 
performance of SOEs and the overall efficiency of financial markets. Along with privatiza-
tion reform, the ownership structure of Chinese listed companies has changed and both 
3 The split share structure reform was launched in April 2005, with the aim to improve financial market 
liberalization. It is required that the shareholders of non-tradable shares should propose a plan for compen-
sating tradable shareholders. Once the reform plan was approved by tradable shareholders, it was submitted 
to the China’s Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC). Then, the reform plan became effective after the 
CSRC’s approval. By the end of 2007, 1260 firms have completed the reform process (Liao et al. 2014).
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the proportion of state-owned listed firms and state-ownership in percentage has declined 
significantly. Zeng and McLaren (2015) find a positive stock market reaction to the reform, 
indicating investors’ belief about the economic gains associated with the reform. However, 
due to less formal institutional environment, the law enforcement on bankruptcy in transi-
tion economies like China is weaker than that of developed economies (Allen et al. 2005). 
In particular, Chinese government tends to restructure rather than liquidate financially dis-
tressed SOEs as majority of their creditors are SOBs, who are reluctant to write-off their 
balance sheets (Fan et  al. 2013; Cull et  al. 2015). This has therefore enabled financially 
distressed SOEs to receive continued financial supports from the SOBs.4
Despite the ongoing privatization reform, Chinese SOEs with weak fundamentals con-
tinue to receive implicit financial supports from the government. For instance, in 2017, 
the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC) and the 
Ministry of Finance in China issued guidance for the disposal of ‘zombie SOEs’ that have 
suffered losses for three consecutive years. Consequently in the same year, more than ten 
listed SOEs announced that they received government subsidies for the disposal of “zom-
bie SOEs”, with the amount ranging from RMB¥10 million to over RMB¥100 million. 
Such implicit guarantee of government bailouts in the event of financial distress would 
improve the likelihood that a firm recovers from distress. The average of recovery time 
(measured as the number of months from the time when a firm is specially treated to the 
removal of its ST status) for SOEs in our sample is 34 months, which is significantly short 
than the non-SOEs (45 months).5
3  Methodology
3.1  Merton’s structural model and default risk measurement
Corporate default risk could be measured in different ways, such as by accounting-based 
models (Altman 1968; Ohlson 1980; Agarwal and Taffler 2008), hazard model (Camp-
bell et al. 2008), credit risk ratings (Avramov et al. 2009), structural models (Vassalou and 
Xing 2004; Bharath and Shumway 2008) and credit ratings (Löffler 2013). In this paper, 
we employ a structural model to capture the default likelihood of Chinese companies. 
The structural models (e.g. Merton 1974), also known as contingent claim models, take 
firm’s equity as a call option on its assets by following the option pricing theory (Black 
and Scholes 1973). In contrast to accounting-based models, structural models consider 
the time variance of default risk, i.e. the likelihood that the market value of assets drops 
below the face value of its liabilities, by deducting the market value and asset volatility 
from the simultaneous solution of equations.6 The validity of such models has been assured 
4 For instance, after the announcement of strategic restructuring of Bao Steel and Wuhan Steel in 2016, the 
China Construction Bank proposed a plan of $3.6 Billion debt relief for Wuhan Steel.
5 Source: Author’s own calculations.
6 Since 1980 s, Merton’s structural model has been further developed by practitioners of KMV Corpora-
tion, currently known as Moody’s KMV since the acquisition in 2002, by incorporating the empirical distri-
bution of default probabilities where distance to default (DD) of each firm is captured in the first place and 
then the one-year Estimated Default Frequency (EDF) is derived based on KMV’s extensive database of 
default events. Since then, additional default risk models have been developed, such as BSG-based contin-
gent claims model (Hillegeist et al. 2004), discrete time hazard model (Campbell et al. 2008), cox propor-
tional hazard model (Bharath and Shumway 2008), and etc.
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in various markets apart from the U.S., such as U.K. (Tudela and Young 2005), Japan (Xu 
and Zhang 2009), Australia (Gharghori et al. 2006), among others, and proved to be a valid 
model for forecasting corporate default probabilities. The advantages of structural models 
also lie in the usage of both observable driving variables and timely trading information 
from equity markets which is more informative and efficient than that from credit markets.
In Merton’s structural model, the pay-offs to the equity holders are equivalent to the 
pay-offs of a call option holder on the value of a firm and the strike price of the call option 
is the face value of the firm’s debt. Therefore, the value of the option would drop to zero 
once the value of the firm decreases to the strike price and the value of the call option 
increases with asset value as long as the asset value is greater than the debt value. Bank-
ruptcy may happen when asset value is lower than the redemption value of debt. Assuming 
that the value of the firm VA follows a geometric Brownian motion process, the value of the 
firm at time t would be:
where 휇 is the mean rate of return on the firm’s assets and 휎A is the constant volatility of 
firm assets. Based on the option pricing function (Black and Scholes 1973), the value of 
the firm’s equity (a European call) at time t is given by:
where Dt is the book value of the firm’s debt with a maturity date of T, N
(
d1
)
 and N
(
d2
)
 
are risk-adjusted probabilities, and r represents the risk-free interest rate. The values of d1 
and d2 are defined as:
Hence, a firm’s default risk exposure could be inferred from the proximity of the total 
value of its assets to the total value of its debt. As long as the market value of assets and 
its volatility are available, default likelihood indicator (DLI hereafter), which captures the 
probability of debt value being greater than market asset value at the end of each period 
( N
(
−d2
)
 ), can be derived as:
Empirically, we employ the iterative procedure to estimate monthly DLI of each firm. 
Details of this process are provided in the “Appendix 2”.
3.2  Cross‑sectional regression
We follow Fama and MacBeth (1973) and employ an across-sectional regression method to 
test the empirical validation and implications of Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) by 
considering the roles played by firm specific characteristics in explaining cross-sectional 
differences in expected returns (e.g. Fama and French 2008; Campbell et al. 2008). In addi-
tion, we estimate adjusted standard errors by Newey–West procedure (Newey and West 
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1987) to correct the bias of Fama–MacBeth model due to the heteroscedasticity and auto-
correlation issues (Petersen 2009).
4  Data and variables
4.1  Data
Our empirical data are collected from the Chinese Stock Market and Accounting Research 
(CSMAR) database on companies publicly listed (A-shares) on either Shanghai Stock 
Exchange (SSE) or Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE) in China between January 2003 and 
December 2015, excluding delisted and financial firms (Liao et al. 2014).7 Our final sam-
ple covers companies operating in industrials, real estate, commercials, utilities and others, 
with a nature of unbalanced panel with a maximum of 2010 firms in 2015 and a minimum 
of 976 firms in 2003. We collect daily and monthly stock returns and annual firm funda-
mental data for the empirical analysis.
In the following empirical analysis on the ‘risk–return’ relationship, our sample consists 
of 213,173 firm-month observations between 2003 and 2015. Although we primarily focus 
on the moderating effects of state ownership in market pricing of default risk, we run ST 
samples and all other samples separately in the empirical analysis because they face vari-
ous trading and financial restrictions.
4.2  Is DLI a valid measure of default risk?
We employ Merton’s structural model and measure monthly DLI using daily stock returns, 
market equity value, book asset value, short-term debt and long-term debt as key inputs. 
Table 1 reports the average DLI for the full sample and ST sample overtime, respectively, 
and shows that ST firms have greater DLI than those of the full sample. It also shows that 
the global financial crisis drove up DLI in Chinese stock markets8 to the highest level in 
2008, suggesting that the default risk can be triggered either by idiosyncratic risks or by 
aggregate macroeconomic shocks (Hackbarth et  al. 2006). The default risk of ST firms 
peaked in 2005 due to the accumulation of bad debts among the SOEs as well as the start 
of four state owned banks’ privatization.
Prior studies on the evaluation of default risk prediction models focus on the predic-
tive ability of models against corporate failures. Table  1 shows that the average DLI 
is much higher for firms in ST status than firms in normal status, indicating that DLI 
is capable of capturing financial distress of Chinese listed firms. When a listed firm is 
designated as ST and continues to make losses for two more years, it will be delisted 
form stock exchange. Thus, we identify failure firms as those have been publicly listed 
for at least two consecutive years and were delisted from the stock market (delisting for 
any reason) during the sample period from 2003 to 2015. In our sample, the average 
7 Firm-level state ownership data is unavailable prior to 2003.
8 For comparison purpose, we calculate DLIs for US firms by following the same approach. Figure  4 
(Appendix) shows that the movement of DLIs in both countries became more strongly associated since 
financial crisis and the correlation coefficient increased from 0.39 overall to 0.78 since 2008, suggest-
ing an increased integration among international financial markets and the rise of global systematic risk 
(Lehkonen 2014).
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Table 1  Descriptive statistics: 
DLI
This table reports the average number of stocks and average default 
likelihood indicator (DLI), in basis points between 2003 and 2015. 
The full sample includes all nonfinancial A-shares, and the ST sam-
ples include stocks of firms that are designated as ST, ST* or PT sta-
tus in each year. The annual DLI is the arithmetic average of monthly 
default likelihood across firms
Year Full sample ST firms
Number of stocks DLI (bps) Number of 
stocks
DLI (bps)
2003 976 126.62 78 212.82
2004 1041 193.16 56 349.11
2005 1110 576.03 50 916.79
2006 1208 148.17 82 256.74
2007 1207 26.15 73 48.57
2008 1271 676.67 33 734.93
2009 1398 357.91 48 448.55
2010 1451 46.59 61 71.67
2011 1544 47.67 27 62.92
2012 1768 133.12 37 236.96
2013 1916 44.80 37 97.46
2014 1985 34.32 35 83.33
2015 2010 30.78 44 40.76
Fig. 1  DLI of Chinese delisted firms prior to delisting. This figure plots the monthly average default prob-
ability (DLI) of delist firms and other listed firms in normal status. The delisted sample includes all firms 
that were delisted from 2003 to 2015. DLI_delist firms is calculated as the monthly average DLI over 
24-month prior to delisting across the delist sample. For each delisted firm i, we calculate the monthly aver-
age DLI across the full sample excluding i over the 24-month period. Thus, DLI_other firms in each month 
[− 24, − 1] is calculated as the average of those mean DLIs
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DLI for 73 delisted firm over 12-month (or 24-month) prior to delisting are 717.16 bps 
(567.56 bps), and is almost two times larger than the average DLI for other firms (as 
shown in Fig. 1). Figure 1 also clearly shows that the probabilities of default continu-
ously increase during 24 months before the delisting. As such, our DLI variable consti-
tutes a valid ex ante measure of corporate default risk.
4.3  Other variables
To capture the cross-sectional heterogeneity in expected stock returns at firm level, we 
follow Fama and French (2008) and Gharghori et  al. (2009) to investigate firm char-
acteristics including firm size (MV), book-to-market ratio (B/M), past returns (MOM), 
leverage (leverage), profitability (profitability), capital expenditure (CAPX) and their 
relationship with default risk. Following Liao et al. (2014), we employ two alternative 
measures of ownership structure, i.e. state-ownership (SO) which is the ratio of state-
owned shares to total shares outstanding and a dummy (SOE) which is coded as 1 if the 
ultimate controlling party of a sample firm is state. We report variable construction in 
Table 12 (Appendix).
Table  2 documents the variation of DLIs over state-ownership which is measured by 
either the percentage of state share-holding (SO) or ultimate controlling party (SOE vs. 
non SOE). Overall, our descriptive statistics shows that DLIs increase over state-owner-
ship, consistent with the evidence of Law and Roache (2015).
Table 3 reports the correlation matrix for the key variables and shows that firm default 
risk (DLI) is negatively correlated with firm size, B/M ratio, profitability and investment 
(CAPX), and positively correlated with leverage ratio, consistent with existing evidence 
(e.g. Vassalou and Xing 2004; Bhattacharjee and Han 2014; Law and Roache 2015; Fil-
ipe et  al. 2016). The correlations between DLI and expected returns are positive for the 
full sample, but the magnitude of coefficient becomes much smaller for samples with high 
state-ownership and SOEs, partially supporting our conjecture that government protec-
tion over SOEs may have been well recognized by investors. Even facing financial distress, 
state-backed shareholders would have a much stronger bargaining power compared with 
their counterparts in non SOEs (Fan et al. 2013).
Table 2  Descriptive statistics: DLI over state-ownership
This table reports summary statistics of default likelihood indicator (DLI, bps) over state-ownership 
(SO). In Panel A, samples are categorized into groups without (Zero SO), low (0 < SO ≤ 50%) and high 
(SO > 50%) state-ownership, respectively. In Panel B, a sample firm is classified as a SOE if its ultimate 
controlling shareholder is the state. Median and P75 represent the 50th, and 75th percentiles of DLI, respec-
tively
Obs Mean Median P75 S.D. Skewness
Panel A By state-ownership percentage
Zero SO 123,171 117.46 0.13 16.27 434.17 8.35
Low SO (0 < SO ≤ 50%) 67,306 234.29 1.11 84.74 678.02 6.08
High SO (SO > 50%) 25,953 246.70 3.70 170.59 576.54 4.86
Panel B By ultimate controlling shareholder
Non SOEs 89,850 154.53 0.15 23.62 545.46 7.85
SOEs 125,122 180.81 0.73 53.68 541.22 6.34
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4.4  Default risk prediction
In this section, we aim to examine whether default probabilities  (DLIt) of Chinese listed 
firms are related to firm fundamentals, such as state-ownership  (SOt−1). We perform 
Fama–Macbeth regression and adjust for within-cluster autocorrelations clustered by firm 
and report the results in Table 4.
Table 4 shows that the percentage of state-ownership  (SOt−1) is positively and signifi-
cantly correlated with DLI in all models estimated. This is consistent with our conjecture 
and suggests that state-ownership is likely to lead to a higher default probability, all else 
equal. This result is similar to the findings in Law and Roache (2015), that the probabilities 
of default for central SOEs are higher than local SOEs.
Signs on the coefficients of other control variables are similar to those reported in the 
correlation matrix (Table 2), showing that firms which are smaller, less profitable, highly 
leveraged and with less growth opportunities are more likely to have greater default risk. 
Table 3  Correlation matrix
This table reports the time-series average of monthly cross-sectional correlations between DLI and other 
variables, covering the period between 2003 and 2015. Details of variable constructions are provided in 
the Appendix (Table 12). Panels A, B and C present the correlations for the full sample, samples where the 
state-ownership (SO) is higher than 50% and state-owned enterprises (SOEs), respectively
*Denotes a statistical significant level of 5%
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6
Panel A Full sample
1 DLI 1
2 Return 0.031* 1
3 MV − 0.240* − 0.037* 1
4 BM − 0.181* 0.017* − 0.183* 1
5 Profitability − 0.106* − 0.021* 0.255* − 0.124* 1
6 CAPX − 0.015* − 0.009 0.047* 0.087* 0.301* 1
7 Leverage 0.241* 0.006 0.033* − 0.114* − 0.113* − 0.178*
Panel B High SO firms (SO > 50%)
1 DLI 1
2 Return 0.007 1
3 MV − 0.166* − 0.021* 1
4 BM − 0.127* 0.011 − 0.108* 1
5 Profitability − 0.141* − 0.013* 0.305* − 0.138* 1
6 CAPX − 0.175* 0.007 0.204* 0.128* 0.368* 1
7 Leverage 0.287* 0.017* 0.048* − 0.113* − 0.134* − 0.072*
Panel C SOEs
1 DLI 1
2 Return 0.010* 1
3 MV − 0.175* − 0.018* 1
4 BM − 0.139* 0.009 − 0.132* 1
5 Profitability − 0.171* − 0.015* 0.218* − 0.417* 1
6 CAPX − 0.183* 0.011 0.093* 0.092* 0.131* 1
7 Leverage 0.264* 0.016* 0.062* − 0.104* 0.149* − 0.076*
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Moreover, given the different nature9 of firms listed on the two stock exchanges in China, 
the negative and statistically significant coefficient of the SSE dummy variable suggests 
that on average, stocks listed on SSE are subject to lower default risks. In terms of the 
systematic industry effect on firms’ default risk exposure, firms operating in real estate 
sector (Model 6) and industrial sector (Model 8) are detected of having a higher default 
probability. This is consistent with expectations that excessive government-oriented invest-
ments over past decades and the higher leverage nature of the two industries have resulted 
to higher default probability of firms operating in the sectors. In general, results in Table 4 
are consistent with findings in Vassalou and Xing (2004) and Altman et al. (2017), which 
discuss the link between default probabilities or financial distress and firm-specific charac-
teristics in the U.S. market and find that firm size, profitability, liquidity and age are signifi-
cantly correlated with default risk.
5  Pricing of default risk
This paper aims to investigate the relationship between default risk and expected stock 
returns in a Chinese setting by considering the moderating effects of state-ownership. We 
commence the empirical analysis using univariate tests to document the portfolio return 
variations over default risk and firm level controls. Then, we run Fama–MacBeth cross-
sectional regressions to investigate the ‘risk–return’ relationship and a multivariate analysis 
on the relationship between default risk and firm fundamentals. Finally, we run a set of 
additional regressions to test the robustness of our empirical results.
5.1  Portfolio analysis
Before running regression analysis, we examine if corporate fundamentals and returns vary 
over default risk exposure by employing a portfolio sorting approach which is less sensitive 
to outliers as it considers the idiosyncratic return co-movements. At the end of each month 
over the sample period, all firms are ranked based on their DLIs, and then are assigned to 
one of the five quintiles. Portfolios 1 and 5 denote group of firms with the lowest and high-
est default possibility, respectively. Portfolios are held for 1-month, and are rebalanced at 
the end of each month based on newly estimated default likelihood.
We merge monthly stock returns with the prior month’s default likelihood indicator 
(DLI) to examine whether patterns in expected stock returns is related to default risk. Fol-
lowing Fama and French (1993), we retain a gap of 5-month between accounting data and 
stock return data to ensure that the accounting information is publicly available to investors 
before portfolio construction.
Panel A of Table 5 reports the variation of firm characteristics of five portfolios with 
ranked DLIs in quintiles. Apart from market value (MV) which is estimated as the time-
series averages of monthly cross-sectional means,10 other firm characteristics are the 
10 The distribution of firm size is highly skewed. The results will be driven by extreme large size numbers 
if averages of means are used.
9 Shanghai Stock Exchange (SSE) is significantly different from Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE) in 
terms of market microstructure, especially in their listing requirements (Qiao et al. 2008). This is somewhat 
similar to the difference between the NYSE and NASDAQ stock exchanges in US. As compared with SSE, 
firms listed on SZSE are much smaller, less liquid and more volatile.
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time-series averages of cross-sectional medians. Overall, Panel A suggests that firms tend 
to have lower default risks if they are larger in size, more profitable, less leveraged and 
having relatively lower state-ownership. To verify that our default likelihood measure is 
capable of capturing variations in default risk, we also apply two alternative default risk 
measures, DTD_CRI (Duan et al. 2012)11 and Z-score (Altman 1968). It is found that both 
measures decrease monotonically from portfolio 1 to portfolio 5, hence confirming that 
portfolio 5 has the highest default risk and vice versa.
For portfolio returns, we first compute the arithmetic average monthly expected stock 
return for each portfolio, and then compute the average return across the sample period. 
Table 5  Performance of default risk portfolios
Panel A reports default risk and firm characteristics for DLI portfolios between January 2003 and Decem-
ber 2015. Details of variable constructions are provided in the Appendix (Table  12). Portfolios 1 and 5 
represent sample quintiles that comprise stocks with the lowest and highest default risk, respectively. H–L 
represents a portfolio that is long portfolio 5 and short portfolio 1. Panel B reports the monthly equal-
weighted (EW) and value-weighted (VW) raw returns. Panel C reports the monthly equal-weighted and 
value-weighted alphas from the CAPM model. The corresponding t-statistics in parentheses are adjusted 
using heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors of Newey and West (1987)
Statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1% levels is denoted by *, **, and ***, respectively
Portfolio DLI Low (1) 2 3 4 High (5) H–L t
Panel A Firm characteristics
DLI (bps) 11.28 47.48 93.06 171.47 607.88 596.60 (9.06)
MV (Million) 5168.1 4297.8 3983.2 3937.9 4214.9 − 953.2 (− 6.23)
BM 0.37 0.44 0.46 0.46 0.44 0.07 (9.87)
TA (Million) 6395.3 5903.6 6499.8 8092.0 12,089.4 5694.1 (7.26)
Profitability 0.09 0.07 0.06 0.04 0.03 − 0.06 (− 12.31)
CAPX 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.02 (4.25)
Leverage 0.37 0.46 0.51 0.56 0.61 0.24 (56.83)
SO (%) 16.47 16.52 16.72 16.88 18.27 1.80 (5.60)
Asset volatility 0.37 0.36 0.35 0.36 0.44 0.07 (13.39)
Distance to default (DTD_CRI) 6.29 4.67 4.02 3.55 3.12 − 3.17 (− 39.08)
Z-score 1.09 0.99 0.92 0.86 0.74 − 0.35 (− 15.52)
Panel B Raw returns of DLI portfolio
Equal-weighted (EW) 1.822** 1.961** 2.067** 2.237** 2.402*** 0.579*** (2.60)
(2.31) (2.36) (2.42) (2.56) (2.68)
Value-weighted (VW) 1.351* 1.571** 1.547* 1.681** 1.826** 0.475** (2.15)
(1.87) (2.02) (1.91) (2.04) (2.18)
Panel C. CAPM alphas of DLI portfolio
Equal-weighted (EW) 0.581 0.663 0.757 0.909* 1.083** 0.502** (2.25)
(1.41) (1.52) (1.65) (1.88) (2.14)
Value-weighted (VW) 0.148 0.279 0.230 0.353 0.488* 0.340* (1.88)
(0.47) (0.86) (0.63) (1.25) (1.96)
11 We are grateful to the Credit Research Initiative at the Risk Management Institute of National University 
of Singapore for providing us the data. DTD_CRI is calculated using a modified Merton-type model of 
Duan et al. (2012).
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Panels B and C (Table  5) show a clear positive relationship between DLI and expected 
stock returns and such a finding is robust to both equal-weight (EW) and value-weighted 
(VW) methods, and to the raw returns and risk-adjusted returns.12 Based on the EW esti-
mation, the monthly expected raw returns for portfolio 5 and portfolio 1 are 2.402% and 
1.826% respectively and the return spread for all five portfolios are statistically significant 
at a 1% level (0.590% with t = 2.60). Panel C shows consistent results to Panel B where 
portfolio with higher default risk would generate higher stock returns.
Fama and French (1992, 1993) and Vassalou and Xing (2004) show that default risk 
premium is associated with the size and value effect. Therefore, we test whether size and 
B/M are proxying default risk in Chinese stock market using dependent double-sorting 
approach. We firstly sort sample firms into three portfolios based on their past month’s 
market capitalization (SIZE), and book-to-market ratio (B/M). For each SIZE (small, 
medium and large) and B/M (growth, medium and value) portfolio, we further sort stocks 
Table 6  Returns on dependent double sorted DLI-Size (B/M) portfolios
This table reports the monthly equal-weighted (EW) average returns by using two-way dependent sorts 
between 2003 and 2015. At the end of each month, firms are sorted into three portfolios based on their past 
month’s market capitalization (SIZE) and book-to-market ratio (B/M). Within each SIZE or B/M portfolio, 
firms are dependently sorted into five portfolios based on their past month’s default likelihood indicator 
(DLI). The portfolios are rebalanced monthly. The corresponding t-statistics are adjusted using the hetero-
scedasticity-consistent standard errors of Newey and West (1987)
*, **, and *** denote statistical significant level at 10, 5 and 1%, respectively. The results for medium size 
and medium B/M portfolios are not tabulated to conserve space but available from the authors on request
DLI Quintiles
Low (1) 2 3 4 High (5) H–L
Panel A DLI and size
Size
 Small 2.451*** 2.653*** 3.072*** 2.871*** 3.313*** 0.862***
(2.81) (2.96) (3.44) (3.13) (3.48) (3.31)
 Large 1.555** 1.598** 1.571** 1.644** 1.740** 0.185
(2.19) (2.07) (1.98) (2.04) (2.13) (0.40)
 Small-large 0.896* 1.055** 1.501*** 1.311*** 1.573***
(1.95) (2.41) (3.65) (3.22) (3.44)
Panel B DLI and BM
B/M
 Growth 1.584** 1.778** 1.803** 2.161** 2.297** 0.713***
(2.06) (2.15) (2.13) (2.38) (2.51) (2.60)
 Value 1.881** 2.137** 2.257** 2.241** 2.454*** 0.574**
(2.25) (2.51) (2.59) (2.54) (2.82) (1.99)
 Value-growth 0.296 0.359 0.454 0.080 0.158
(0.90) (1.21) (1.52) (0.26) (0.52)
12 Due to the lack of consistency in the explanatory power of the Fama–French three factors in pricing 
Chinese stock returns documented in prior studies (Lin et al. 2012; Morelli 2012; Hu et al. 2018), we didn’t 
report the alphas from the three-factor model. Results are available from the authors on request.
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into five subgroups based on their DLIs. Table 6 reports the average monthly stock returns 
for each subgroup. Specifically, Panels A and B reports the default risk effect controlling 
for firm size and B/M, respectively. Panel A of Table 5 shows that overall, high default 
risk stocks earn higher returns than low risk stocks; while, the risk premium is statistically 
insignificant for large firms where the return spread is 0.185% (t = 0.40). This is consistent 
with existing literature (e.g. Hu et al. 2018) that firm size is the strongest factor in explain-
ing the cross-section stock returns in Chinese stock markets and shareholders of large firms 
have a stronger bargaining power in debt refinancing and renegotiation (Garlappi et  al. 
2008). As a result, shareholders of large firms may not require an equivalent risk premium 
for additional risk bearing as those of small firms.
Panel B (Table  6) indicates that default risk is rewarded with higher returns in both 
growth firms (0.713%, t = 2.60) and value firms (0.574%, t = 1.99), Our findings are incon-
sistent with that of Vassalou and Xing (2004), where default risk premium is more pro-
nounced among value firms. This could be due to the weak return predictive power of the 
B/M in China (Hilliard and Zhang 2015, Hu et al. 2018). In addition, our results suggest 
that the default risk effect is independent of B/M.
Based on the positive association between DLI and state-ownership observed in pre-
vious sections, we then apply dependent double-sorting to further explore the interaction 
Table 7  Returns on dependent double sorted DLI-ownership portfolios
This table reports the monthly equal-weighted (EW) average returns by using two-way dependent sorts 
between 2003 and 2015. At the end of each month, firms are sorted into three (two) portfolios based on 
their state-ownership percentage (SO), and ownership structure (SOE). Within each SIZE, SO and SOE 
portfolio, firms are dependently sorted into five portfolios based on their past month’s default likelihood 
indicator (DLI). The portfolios are rebalanced monthly. The corresponding t-statistics are adjusted using the 
heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors of Newey and West (1987)
*, **, and *** denote statistical significant level at 10, 5 and 1%, respectively. The results for low SO 
(0 < SO ≤ 50%) portfolios are not tabulated to conserve space but available from the authors on request
DLI quintiles
Low (1) 2 3 4 High (5) H–L
Panel A DLI and SO
SO (%)
 Zero SO 1.826** 2.030** 2.210*** 2.313*** 2.592*** 0.766**
(2.36) (2.49) (2.64) (2.73) (2.92) (2.10)
 High (SO > 50%) 1.730** 2.096** 1.970** 1.960** 2.080** 0.350
(2.02) (2.61) (2.08) (2.35) (2.30) (0.93)
 Zero-high 0.096 − 0.067 0.240 0.453 0.512
(0.53) (− 0.21) (0.72) (1.42) (1.41)
Panel B DLI and SOE
SOE
 Non SOEs 2.066** 2.193*** 2.182** 2.475*** 2.859*** 0.793***
(2.54) (2.57) (2.56) (2.84) (3.11) (2.67)
 SOEs 1.779** 1.792** 1.983** 2.130** 2.205*** 0.426
(2.21) (2.23) (2.39) (2.53) (2.75) (1.54)
 Non SOEs-SOEs 0.287 0.401* 0.308 0.470** 0.654**
(1.50) (1.67) (1.27) (2.23) (2.11)
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between firms’ default risk and ownership structure in determining expected stock returns. 
Hence, we firstly sort sample firms into either three or two portfolios based on their state-
ownership percentage (SO) and ownership structure (SOE). For each SO (zero, low and 
high state-ownership) and SOE (SOEs and non-SOEs) portfolio, we further sort stocks into 
five subgroups based on their DLIs. We then examine the average holding returns of each 
subgroup in the month following portfolio formation. Table 7 reports the average monthly 
stock returns for each subgroup. Panel A shows that the return spread between high and low 
default risk firms is 0.766% (t = 2.10) per month for the zero SO sample, but smaller and 
not statistically significant for the high SO sample (0.350%, t = 0.93). In addition, the zero 
SO (non-SOE) and high default risk portfolios earn anomalously high returns (2.592%, 
t = 2.92; 2.859%, t = 3.11), indicating that default risk is rewarded with higher returns in 
zero SO and non-SOE firms as investors generally expect higher returns for holding stocks 
of those firms. Thus, our evidence supports the argument that shareholders of state-owned 
firms tend to have lower required rate of returns for default risk exposure as they tend to 
have ‘shareholder advantage’ (Garlappi et al. 2008) or they are more likely to be politically 
connected (Boubakri et al. 2012).
In addition, we examine the interaction between size and state-ownership in explaining 
the default risk–return relationship by performing triple sorts (Table 13, Appendix). Our 
results show that the default risk premium can be attributed more to state-ownership than 
firm size. As a robustness check, we apply CAPM to calculate risk-adjust returns of the 
double and trip sorted portfolios (Tables 14 and 15, Appendix).
5.2  Cross‑sectional analysis
To provide a structural and multivariate view of the cross-sectional relationship between 
corporate default risk and expected stock returns, we further apply Fama and Macbeth 
(1973) cross-sectional regressions as specified below:
where ri,t+1 is the monthly raw return of stock i in month t + 1. rf ,t+1 is the monthly-based 
1-year Treasury-bill rate, ln(DLI)i,t is the natural logarithm of the default likelihood indica-
tor of stock i, ln(MV)i,t is the natural logarithm of market capitalization of equity, ln(BM)i,t 
is the natural logarithm of the ratio of the book value of equity for the previous fiscal year 
divided by market equity in month t, and MOMi,t is the cumulative compounded stock 
returns of the previous 6 months at the end of month t.
In Eq.  5, we only include default risk (DLI) as the independent variable to explain 
cross-sectional stock returns. Equation 6 represents the basic benchmark model and Eq. 7 
includes both default risk and other three control variables as the independent variables. 
For each month t, we run Fama and Macbeth (1973) cross-sectional regressions of monthly 
excess returns on given variables. Table 8 presents the estimated coefficients on DLI and 
control variables, which are calculated as the time-series averages of monthly cross-sec-
tional regression coefficients. The coefficients represent the premium returned to stock-
holders’ risk exposure to each variable.
Specifically, our Fama–MacBeth regression considers the effect of DLIs (Models 1, 4 
and 7) and firm fundaments (Models 2, 5 and 8) independently and their combined effects 
(5)ri,t+1 − rf ,t+1 = 훼0 + 훽1ln(DLI)i,t + 휀i,t
(6)ri,t+1 − rf ,t+1 = 훼0 + 훽2ln(MV)i,t + 훽3ln(BM)i,t + 훽4MOMi,t + 휀i,t
(7)ri,t+1 − rf ,t+1 = 훼0 + 훽1ln(DLI)i,t + 훽2ln(MV)i,t + 훽3ln(BM)i,t + 훽4MOMi,t + 휀i,t
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(Models 3, 6 and 9) on monthly excess returns. Table 8 shows consistent evidence on the 
positive relationship between corporate default risk and stock returns over different sample 
groups, i.e. full, ST and non-ST samples. For example, holding firm fundamentals constant, 
one unit increase in corporate default risk, ln(DLI), would reward investors with an excess 
monthly return of about 0.04% for full samples (Model 3), 0.05% for ST samples (Model 6) 
and 0.03% for non-ST samples (Model 9). Additionally, we show that the book-to-market 
ratio is positively but insignificantly related to the cross-section of returns. This is consist-
ent with our earlier findings in double sorting. Overall, Table 8 shows clear evidence on the 
existence of cross-sectional return predictability of default risk in Chinese stock markets.
To further investigate the impact of corporate ownership structure on the cross-sectional 
pricing of default risk, we divide the full sample, according to the percentage of state-
ownership and their ownership status, into SOE or non-SOE, and re-run the cross-sectional 
models (Table 9). As expected, firms with zero state-ownership, or characterized as non-
SOEs, tend to reward the investors with higher risk premium but for both high SO and SOE 
firms, the coefficients of DLI are statistically insignificant. Such a finding is consistent with 
our prior estimation based on the double sorting approach (Table 7). Findings revealed in 
Table 9 reinforce the nature of inefficiency of Chinese capital market where shareholders 
of SOEs are not fully rewarded for bearing higher default risk and the state-ownership is 
still perceived by investors as offering implicit guarantee for financial distress. For exam-
ple, for firms with zero SO or non-SOEs, investors will be rewarded with approximately 
0.04% monthly excess return for bearing an extra unit of default risk after controlling for 
firm characteristics. Overall, the results suggest that default risk is not consistently priced 
in cross-sectional stock returns among SOEs.
To examine the marginal effect of state ownership on the default risk–return relation-
ship, we focus on the interaction between state ownership and default risk using cross-
sectional regression analysis. Table 10 reports the result of the Fama and MacBeth (1973) 
regression. In Model 1 and Model 2, we run simple regressions by adding firms’ state own-
ership (SO) and ownership characteristics (SOE) to Eq.  (7). The coefficients of both SO 
and SOE are negative but insignificant, suggesting that state ownership is not significantly 
associated with cross-sectional stock returns.
In Model 3 and Model 4, we include the extra interaction term, ln(DLI)*SO and 
ln(DLI)*SOE. As predicted, we show that the coefficients of the interaction terms 
between default risk and state ownership are − 0.452 (t-statistics = −2.06) and − 0.304 
(t-statistics = −2.34) and both are statistically significant. This result suggests that for 
firms with high default risk, state ownership has a negative impact on stock returns. In 
Model 5 and Model 6, we include an additional interaction term, ln(DLI)*ln(MV)*SO and 
ln(DLI)*ln(MV)*SOE respectively. The coefficients on the three-way interaction terms are 
significantly positive, indicating that the interaction between default risk and state owner-
ship is more pronounced among small firms. In addition, the coefficients on the interaction 
between default risk and state ownership remains significant and have similar magnitude as 
those in Model 3 and Model 4. Thus, our main conclusion remains unaltered.
5.3  Robustness tests
To check the robustness of our results, we perform additional tests along two dimensions. 
First, we assess whether the cross-sectional results sorted by state-ownership are robust 
with alternative measure of firm-level default risk. We replace DLI with the distance-to-
default (DTD_CRI) proposed by Duan et  al. (2012). Firm-level DTD_CRI is estimated 
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based on the structure model using the transformed-dada maximum likelihood estimation 
method, accounting for the high leverage feature of some financial firms. The dramatic 
economic development of China has been accompanied by an increase in firms’ (especially 
SOEs) leverage ratio. We, therefore, aim to test whether the relationship between stock 
returns and default probability is sensitive to the estimation of default risk. Table 11 shows 
consistent results to our earlier findings (Tables 8 and 9) that the loading on ln(DTD_CRI) 
is negative for the full sample, suggesting that firms with higher distance-to-default tend to 
have lower expected stock returns. In particular, the loadings on ln(DTD_CRI) are nega-
tive and statistically significant for low SO and non-SOEs firms, but are insignificant for 
both high SO and SOEs firms. This is also consistent with the findings in tripe sorting 
Table 10  Fama–MacBeth cross-sectional regression with interaction terms
This table presents the Fama–MacBeth regression results. The reported slopes are the time-series averages 
of cross-sectional coefficients from the regression. For each month over the period from January of 2003 to 
December of 2015, we run Fama–Macbeth cross-sectional regressions of monthly excess returns on DLI 
plus the control variables for the full sample. Ln(DLI) is the natural logarithm of monthly firm’s default 
likelihood indicator. Control variables are ln(MV), the natural logarithm of market capitalization; ln(BM), 
the natural logarithm of the ratio of the book value of equity to the market value of equity; MOM, the 
cumulative compounded stock returns of the previous 6 months; SO, ratio of state-ownership shares; SOE, 
a dummy equals to 1 if the firm’s ultimate controlling party is the state. Interaction terms ln(DLI)*SO, 
ln(DLI)*SOE, ln(DLI)*ln(MV)*SO and ln(DLI)*ln(MV)*SOE are computed as the product of correspond-
ing variables. The corresponding t-statistics in parentheses are based on Newey and West (1987) standard 
errors
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
lnDLI 0.032* 0.033** 0.037 0.031 0.030 0.029
(1.90) (2.01) (1.59) (1.38) (1.51) (1.33)
lnMV − 0.530*** − 0.512*** − 0.529*** − 0.510*** − 0.574*** − 0.631***
(− 2.98) (− 2.92) (− 2.97) (− 2.91) (− 3.11) (− 3.38)
lnBM 0.538 0.645 0.535 0.645 0.554 0.656
(0.93) (1.16) (0.92) (1.17) (0.96) (1.19)
MOM 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.49) (0.58) (0.51) (0.61) (0.50) (0.59)
SO − 0.416 − 0.460 − 0.330
(− 1.37) (− 1.40) (− 1.01)
SOE − 0.087 − 0.091 0.014
(− 0.66) (− 0.52) (0.08)
lnDLI*SO − 0.452** − 0.429*
(− 2.06) (− 1.93)
lnDLI*SOE − 0.304** − 0.289*
(− 2.34) (− 1.76)
lnDLI*MV*SO 0.019*
(1.82)
lnDLI*MV*SOE 0.013**
(1.98)
Constant 13.549*** 13.157*** 13.575*** 13.128*** 14.494*** 15.683***
(3.15) (3.12) (3.16) (3.11) (3.29) (3.55)
N 194,768 193,512 194,768 193,512 194,768 193,512
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(Appendix Table 15), which shows that the positive default risk–return relationship is more 
pronounced in small and zero SO (or non-SOEs) firms.
Secondly, we check the robustness of our default risk measure. According to Merton’s 
model, default can only occur on the day of maturity. Once the value of the firm falls below 
the default threshold, the firm will default. The implementation of the structural models 
needs to specify the level of the default point, which may affect the model accuracy signifi-
cantly. Since the forecasting horizon is 1-year in our estimation, the principal of short-term 
debt should be considered as the default point (Leland 2004). According to Crosbie and 
Bohn (2003), the chosen default point by Moody’s KMV model is generally in between the 
short-term debt and total debt. This is because firms’ outstanding long-term debt position 
may affect their holding of short-term debt as the latter is rolling over continuously (Vas-
salou and Xing 2004).
Hence, we use an alternative default point—the principal of short-term debt plus 75% 
of long-term debt (Huang and He 2010) to test the robustness of our tested results. We 
plot the Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curve for the two models with different 
default points. Figure  2 illustrates the trade-off between Type I error (properly labeling 
firms that are distressed or default) and Type II error (incorrectly identifying firms that will 
survive). The area under the ROC curve (AUC) shows the accuracy of different models. 
The diagonal line represents a random model with no predictability power (AUC = 0). A 
Table 11  Cross-sectional regression: DLI_CRI as a measure of default risk
This table presents the Fama–MacBeth regression results for different samples, including the full sample, 
ST firms, non-ST firms, zero state-ownership firms, high state-ownership firms, non-SOES and SOEs. The 
reported slopes are the time-series averages of cross-sectional coefficients from the regression. For each 
month over the period from January of 2003 to December of 2015, we run Fama–Macbeth cross-sectional 
regressions of monthly percentage excess returns on DLI plus the control variables for the full sample. Ln 
(DLI_CRI) is the natural logarithm of monthly firm’s distant to default from CRI. The control variables: 
ln (MV) is the natural logarithm of market capitalization; ln (BM) is the natural logarithm of the ratio of 
the book value of equity to the market value of equity; and MOM is the cumulative compounded stock 
returns of the previous 6  months. The corresponding t-statistics in parentheses are based on Newey and 
West (1987) standard errors
Full sample STs Non-STs Zero SO High SO Non-SOEs SOEs
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 7 Model 8
lnDTD_CRI − 0.305* − 0.419** − 0.340* − 0.506** − 0.171 − 0.400* − 0.273
(− 1.71) (− 2.42) (− 1.70) (− 2.26) (− 0.98) (− 1.90) (− 1.53)
lnMV − 0.573*** − 0.858*** − 0.546*** − 0.547*** − 0.581*** − 0.687*** − 0.503***
(− 3.05) (− 4.43) (− 2.94) (− 2.86) (− 3.06) (− 3.55) (− 2.68)
lnBM 0.592 0.776 0.198 0.338 0.878 0.713 0.651
(0.96) (1.20) (0.25) (0.53) (1.25) (1.16) (0.95)
MOM 0.000 0.000 − 0.000 − 0.000 − 0.000 − 0.000 − 0.000
(0.32) (0.55) (− 1.37) (− 0.18) (− 0.96) (− 0.09) (− 1.01)
Constant 14.612*** 20.419*** 14.249*** 14.461*** 14.339*** 17.114*** 12.888***
(3.26) (4.55) (3.22) (3.18) (3.19) (3.75) (2.88)
N 162,508 43,829 118,679 95,650 18,099 69,264 93,244
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model is considered to be an improvement over the random model if the AUC is greater 
than 0.5 (Fawcett 2006). As shown in Fig. 2, both of the two lines are well above the diago-
nal line. Specifically, the AUC of the two models are 0.81 and 0.65 respectively, indicating 
that predicative power of the model with short-term debt plus 50 percent of long-term debt 
as the default barrier is much stronger, along with our earlier results being robust.
5.4  Why the SOE default risk exposure is not returned correctly?
Earlier results show consistent evidence that the positive relationship between default risk 
and stock return diminishes among SOEs which have higher default risk than their non-
SOE counterparts. In this section, we discuss the possible reasons behind such an anomaly 
we observe from SOEs.
Recent empirical evidence (Filipe et  al. 2016) has suggested that the anomaly could 
be driven by the idiosyncratic part of default risk where the systematic part is positively 
related to stock returns. This may apply to the setting of SOEs in China which are more 
likely to operate in certain industries, such as manufacturing and infrastructure. If this is 
to be the reason, we expect that the effects of state-ownership on default risk (DLIs) would 
be statistically insignificant because such effects have been captured by the industry fixed 
effects. Our empirical results (Appendix Table  17) reject this conjecture and show that 
SOEs still have higher default risks even controlling for industry effects.
The second possible reason could be that in credit markets, SOEs have a competitive 
advantage than non-SOEs and the real default risk effects are lower for SOEs than for non-
SOEs. This possibility is especially prominent in Chinese markets where SOBs implement 
a ‘soft-lending’ practice to SOE borrowers who are in a stronger position than non-SOEs 
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Fig. 2  ROC curves of models with alternative default barrier. This figure shows the ROC curves for the 
default risk models with default point of short-term debt plus 50% long-term debt (left) and short-term debt 
plus 75% long-term debt (right). In each month, firms are ranked from highest default probability to lowest 
default probability based on the two models, and the percentage of ST and delisted firms in each percentile 
is calculated. The figures are then cumulated to generate the ROC for the two models. The 45° line refers to 
the ROC curve under a model with no predictability
 L. Liu et al.
1 3
in negotiating loan deals and renegotiating existing loan facilities (Sapienza 2004; Lu et al. 
2012). Figure 3 shows documentary supporting evidence derived from our data. Panel A 
shows that SOEs have become more highly leveraged (long-term liability to total asset 
ratio) overtime compared with non-SOEs over our data period. Compared with SOEs, non-
SOEs rely more heavily on trade credit (Panel B). As a result, Fig. 3 shows clear evidence 
that SOEs have a better access to formal credit in China and a certain amount of default 
risk could have a stronger adverse effect on the performance of non-SOEs than on SOEs. 
Similar empirical evidence on shareholder advantage in access bank finance is also avail-
able from Garlappi et al. (2008), Garlappi and Yan (2011) and etc.
Strongly related to the second reason, the third reason could be the association between 
political connections and cost of equity. The benefits that firms obtained from government 
support can reduce the cost of equity capital (Boubakri et  al. 2012). Overall, our early 
results are supportive of a negative relationship between political connection (i.e. state-
ownership) and costs of equity (i.e. stock returns), especially for high default risk firms. 
Such a relationship is driven by the tax benefits, soft budgeting (Boubakri et al. 2012) and 
government bailout (Faccio et al. 2006).
6  Conclusion
Existing empirical evidence on the cross-sectional relationship between default risk and 
expected stock returns is inconclusive. On one hand, a positive relationship has been 
widely captured in developed markets (e.g. Vassalou and Xing 2004) and on the other, a 
‘distress puzzle’ may happen in a bankruptcy process (Campbell et al. 2008) where stock 
returns are negatively related to corporate risk. What is little known is the nature of such 
Fig. 3  A comparison between SOEs and non-SOEs on the reliance on long term finance and trade credit. a 
Leverage ratio of SOEs and non-SOEs, b trade credit of SOEs and non-SOEs. This figure reports the aver-
age leverage ratio (long-term debt to total assets) and trade credit [(Accounts payable-accounts receivable)/
total assets] of the sample firms by ownership type from 2013 to 2015. SOEs refer to the listed firms whose 
ultimate control shareholders are government entities
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a ‘risk–return’ relationship in Chinese stock markets with unique features. To advance 
knowledge in emerging financial market, this paper applies a structural model to measure 
firm-level default probabilities and provides a comprehensive investigation on the relation-
ship between default risk and stock returns in China by explicitly considering the moderat-
ing effects of state-ownership.
We run a rich set of tests and show consistent evidence that first, state-ownership is 
positively associated with corporate default risk and firms with high state-ownership 
tend to have greater default risk. Second, we show that the positive ‘risk–return’ rela-
tionship does exist in Chinese stock markets but for those non-SOEs only. Overall, the 
‘high-minus-low’ investment strategy based on default risk would generate an average 
abnormal monthly return of 0.475% (EW) and 0.340% (VW). However, our results do 
not support such a positive ‘risk–return’ relationship for SOEs, suggesting that share-
holders of SOEs would not be compensated appropriately by bearing additional corpo-
rate default risk. Our results are robust to a variety of specifications.
Our results have three important implications. First, for Chinese government and 
creditors, it is important to acknowledge the high default risk associated with SOEs and 
such a factor needs to be taken into account in the loan granting process, especially 
when government guarantee for loans issued to some SOEs (for instance, some sec-
tors are facing a serious threat of overcapacity) becomes weakened. Second, we show 
that shareholders of SOEs are not returned appropriately to compensate their exposure 
to default probabilities, which may not necessarily reflect the firm’s exposure to sys-
tematic default risk. Thus, we call for future research to focus on the modifications of 
default risk estimation models for Chinese firms, and to separately test the contribu-
tion of systematic and idiosyncratic default risk to total default risk. Third, our research 
sheds light on the effect of firms’ ownership structure on stock returns of high default 
risk firms. This evidence can be further tested by investigating the impact of govern-
ment ownership on firm’s cost of equity in China.
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Appendix 1
See Tables 12, 13, 14, 15, 16 and 17 and Fig. 4.
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Table 12  Description of Variables
This table shows the names, descriptions and definitions of variables employed in this study. All of the 
data used to construct these variables are obtained from China Securities Market and Accounting Research 
(CSMAR)
a According to Altman (1968), A denotes EBIT/total assets; B denotes net sales/total assets; C denotes mar-
ket value of equity/total liabilities; D denotes working capital/total assets; and E denotes retained earnings/
total assets
Variables Descriptions Definitions
rit(Return) Monthly stock returns (Pricet−Pricet−1)/Pricet−1
rft Risk-free rate Monthly series of 1-year Treasury-bill rate
VAT Value of total assets dVAt = 휇VAtdt + 휎AVAtdW
D Value of debt Book value of debt (short-term debt plus half the long-term 
debt)
DLI Default likelihood indicator P(VAT < D)
MV Market capitalization of equity Share price * the number of shares outstanding
BM Book-to-market equity Book value of equity/the market value of equity
CAPX Capital expenditure ratio Capital expenditure expenses scaled by book value of total 
assets
Leverage Leverage ratio Total liabilities/book value of total assets
Profitability Profitability ratio Operating income/book value of equity
SO State-ownership The ratio of shares owned by state to total shares outstanding
SOE State owned enterprise Firms whose ultimate controlling party is the state
MOM Momentum returns The cumulative compounded stock returns of the previous 
6 months
DTD_CRI Distant to default How far away a firm is from default point
Z-score The Altman Z-score Z-Score = A * 3.3 + B * 0.99 + C * 0.6 + D * 1.2 + E * 1.4a
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Table 13  Triple sort portfolio returns: default effect controlled by size and ownership
This table represents monthly equal-weighted (EW) average portfolio returns by triple sorting on market 
capitalization (SIZE), state-ownership (SO/SOE) and default risk (DLI). The sample period is from January 
2003 to December 2015. At the end of each month, firms are sorted independently based on their market 
capitalization (SIZE) and state-ownership (SO/SOE). And then for each SIZE/SO or SIZE/SOE portfolio, 
they are dependently sorted by default risk (DLI) into quintiles. The portfolios are rebalanced monthly. The 
corresponding t-statistics are adjusted using the heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors of Newey and 
West (1987)
*, **, and *** denote statistical significant level at 10, 5 and 1%, respectively
DLI Quintiles
Low (1) 2 3 4 High (5) H–L
Panel A Default risk effect controlled for Size and SO
Small
 Zero SO 2.544*** 2.676*** 2.937*** 3.078*** 3.186*** 0.642**
(2.78) (2.95) (3.19) (3.17) (3.26) (2.07)
 High SO 2.543*** 2.557*** 2.890*** 3.193*** 3.078*** 0.535*
(2.71) (2.88) (3.15) (3.31) (3.18) (1.75)
Large
 Zero SO 1.213 1.371* 1.646** 1.616* 1.692** 0.479
(1.65) (1.68) (2.01) (1.92) (1.98) (1.06)
 High SO 1.541** 1.454* 1.415* 1.501* 1.591* 0.050
(2.04) (1.89) (1.80) (1.84) (1.91) (0.11)
Panel B Default risk effect controlled for Size and SOE
Small
 Non-SOEs 2.267** 2.592*** 2.757*** 3.156*** 3.107*** 0.840***
(2.56) (2.88) (3.07) (3.33) (3.25) (2.72)
 SOEs 2.611*** 2.599*** 2.998*** 3.146*** 3.099*** 0.487
(2.82) (2.82) (3.18) (3.19) (3.10) (1.31)
Large
 Non-SOEs 1.250* 1.609* 1.495* 1.660* 1.972** 0.722
(1.69) (1.94) (1.76) (1.94) (2.16) (1.43)
 SOEs 1.371* 1.480* 1.435* 1.542* 1.521* 0.150
(1.85) (1.91) (1.79) (1.89) (1.86) (0.37)
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Table 14  Risk-adjusted returns dependent double sorted DLI-Size and DLI-Ownership portfolios
This table reports the monthly equal-weighted (EW) average alphas by using two-way dependent sorts 
between 2003 and 2015. At the end of each month, firms are sorted into three (two) portfolios based on 
their past month’s market capitalization (SIZE), state-ownership percentage (SO), and ownership structure 
(SOE). Within each SIZE, SO and SOE portfolio, firms are dependently sorted into five portfolios based 
on their past month’s default likelihood indicator (DLI). The portfolios are rebalanced monthly. Portfolio 
risk-adjusted returns are alphas from the CAPM model. The corresponding t-statistics are adjusted using the 
heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors of Newey and West (1987)
*, **, and *** denote statistical significant level at 10, 5 and 1%, respectively. The results for medium 
size portfolios and low SO portfolios are not tabulated to conserve space but available from the authors on 
request
DLI Quintiles
Low (1) 2 3 4 High (5) H–L
Panel A Size and DLI
Size
 Small 1.223** 1.368** 1.550*** 1.776*** 1.862*** 0.640**
(2.11) (2.40) (2.63) (2.82) (2.94) (2.43)
 Large 0.265 0.131 0.179 0.215 0.317 0.052
(0.70) (0.41) (0.54) (0.60) (0.89) (0.13)
 Small-Large 0.958** 1.237*** 1.371*** 1.561*** 1.545***
(1.98) (2.66) (2.71) (3.10) (3.36)
Panel B BM and SO
SO (%)
 Zero SO 0.564 0.603 0.975 1.116* 1.245** 0.681**
(1.27) (1.33) (1.60) (1.82) (2.04) (1.99)
 High (SO > 50%) 0.470 0.774 0.733* 0.723* 0.802** 0.332
(1.53) (1.27) (1.97) (1.88) (2.02) (1.47)
 Zero-High 0.094 − 0.171 0.242 0.393 0.436
(0.37) (0.22) (0.74) (0.91) (1.21)
Panel C DLI and SOE
SOE
 Non SOEs 0.680 0.765 0.904* 1.148** 1.344** 0.664**
(1.43) (1.54) (1.74) (2.10) (2.00) (2.25)
 SOEs 0.480 0.456 0.641 0.727 0.909** 0.389
(1.04) (1.14) (1.47) (1.55) (2.11) (1.50)
 Non SOEs-SOEs 0.200 0.309 0.263 0.421* 0.475**
(1.09) (1.42) (1.37) (1.92) (2.31)
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Table 15  Triple sort portfolio risk-adjusted returns: default effect controlled by size and ownership
This table represents monthly equal-weighted (EW) average portfolio alphas by triple sorting on market 
capitalization (SIZE), state-ownership (SO/SOE) and default risk (DLI). The sample period is from January 
2003 to December 2015. At the end of each month, firms are sorted independently based on their market 
capitalization (SIZE) and state-ownership (SO/SOE). And then for each SIZE/SO or SIZE/SOE portfolio, 
they are dependently sorted by default risk (DLI) into quintiles. The portfolios are rebalanced monthly. The 
corresponding t-statistics are adjusted using the heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors of Newey and 
West (1987)
*, **, and *** denote statistical significant level at 10, 5 and 1%, respectively
DLI Quintiles
Low (1) 2 3 4 High (5) H–L
Panel A Default risk effect controlled for size and SO
Small
 Low SO 1.264** 1.402** 1.471** 1.737*** 1.864*** 0.600*
(2.12) (2.38) (2.38) (2.74) (2.83) (1.82)
 High SO 1.158** 1.279** 1.607*** 1.853*** 1.740*** 0.583
(2.03) (2.31) (2.70) (2.97) (2.77) (1.60)
Large
 Low SO 0.050 0.045 0.321 0.270 0.322 0.271
(0.13) (0.12) (0.87) (0.68) (0.81) (1.26)
 High SO 0.333 0.174 0.101 0.172 0.241 − 0.092
(0.87) (0.54) (0.32) (0.47) (0.65) (− 0.21)
Panel B Default risk effect controlled for Size and SOE
Small
 Non-SOEs 0.986* 1.281** 1.489** 1.835*** 1.790*** 0.803**
(1.81) (2.35) (2.58) (2.99) (2.85) (2.58)
 SOEs 1.331** 1.330** 1.475** 1.801*** 1.750*** 0.420
(2.18) (2.16) (2.34) (2.75) (2.61) (1.29)
Large
 Non-SOEs 0.143 0.312 0.179 0.341 0.552 0.408
(0.32) (0.73) (0.40) (0.74) (1.21) (0.88)
 SOEs 0.171 0.177 0.101 0.211 0.179 0.008
(0.48) (0.59) (0.31) (0.59) (0.52) (0.02)
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Appendix 2
Estimation of default likelihood indicators (DLIs) using the iterative procedure
Firstly, for each stock in our sample, we estimate the volatility of a firm’s equity, denoted 
as 휎E , by calculating the standard deviation of the daily returns on the stock over the past 
12-month. To estimate the volatility of assets 휎A , we treat 휎E as the initial value of equity 
volatility in an iterative procedure. Specifically, we define an interval based on the market 
value and the book value of the company’s debt to extract the root from the equations.
Then, each 휎A is used as the initial value of volatility for the next iteration procedure. 
This procedure is repeated for n times until the adjacent values of 휎A from the two itera-
tions converge differ from each other by less than 0.0001. We restrict the maximum num-
ber of iterations to 1000, but in practice, for the majority of sample firms, it takes less than 
1000 iterations to reach convergence.
After that, we employ the Black–Scholes formula to extract the daily value of assets VAt 
for each trading day during the past 12-month. Then the drift μ is computed as the mean of 
the log returns of VAt.
Finally, we calculate monthly DLI for each stock using the estimated values of μ, 휎A 
together with the values of the firm’s debt and assets.
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